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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

actions were instituted on May 27, 1967. The date of the service
of the summons for each initial action was not specifically determined, but they were served no later than March 27, 1967. The
supreme court, Broome County, ruled that, although the plaintiffs
should have more properly proceeded by seeking to open their
defaults under CPLR 5015,'" the delay of the plaintiffs in serving
the complaints was minor and of short duration and they could,
therefore, bring new actions under CPLR 205(a). Thus, the instant case intimates that a court will look to the particular CPLR
3012 dismissal to determine whether the plaintiff will gain the
benefit of CPLR 205.
Plaintiffs' counsel in the present case failed to note to the
court that 205 (a) bore no relevance to the facts presented. CPLR
205(a) was clearly meant to be only a saving provision. In Virgilio, the suits were for libel, which has a one year period of
limitation."' And, since at the time of decision the original statute
of limitations had not yet expired, Virgilio was not a proper case
for the invocation of CPLR 205(a). The plaintiffs, therefore,
should have been forced to open their defaults through the procedure of CPLR 5015.
CPLR 207(3): Tolling provision applicable where non-resident
motor vehicle owner's address is incorrectly given.
Under CPA § 19, the predecessor of and essentially similar to
CPLR 207, if a person were without the state when a cause of
action accrued against him, or, if a person left the state for four
months or more after such cause of action had accrued against
him, the statute of limitations would be tolled during the period
of his absence. Section 19, however, was inapplicable "[w]hile a
designation or appointment, voluntary or involuntary, made in
pursuance of law, of a resident or non-resident .

.

. private or pub-

lic officer on whom a summons may be served within the state for
another resident or non-resident person . . . with the same legal
force and validity as if served personally on such person . . . with-

in the state, remains in force." 19
The test as to whether CPA § 19 was applicable, i.e., whether
the statute of limitations continued to run regardless of the defendant's absence, was whether the defendant was amenable to
17
See Salinger v. Hollander, 19 App. Div. 2d 559, 241 N.Y.S.2d 43
(2d Dep't 1963).
18 CPLR 215(3).
19
CPA § 19(1).
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such as Sections
process under appropriate statutory provisions,
20
253 and 254 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
In Ellis v. Riley,2 a case decided recently, but governed by
the CPA, the supreme court, Kings County, ruled that if the
driver of an automobile owned by a non-resident gives the nonresident owner's address incorrectly, and the plaintiff is not able
to discover the non-resident's correct address, then the defendant
is not amenable to process within the meaning of Section 253
of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Hence, CPA § 19(1) was inapplicable and, during the period of time it took the plaintiff to discover the non-resident's address, the statute of limitations was
tolled.
Although. the CPLR was inapplicable to Ellis, the decision
hints that the rule would be the same under CPLR 207(3) ,22 assuming, of course, due diligence on the part of the plaintiff.
CPLR 210(b): Held to be a tolling provision.
CPLR 210(b) provides that the "period of eighteen months
after the death . . . of a person against whom a cause of action

exists is not a part of the time within which the action must be
commenced against his executor or administrator." This provision
is "substantially unchanged" 23 from its predecessors, CPA §§ 12
and 21, which were uniformly held to mean that the death of the
statute of limitations for
potential defendant
24 immediately tolled the
eighteen months.

Regardless of the legislative and decisional history surrounding this section, the supreme court, Bronx County, in Schwartz v.
2

oHarvey v. Fussell, 13 Misc. 2d 602, 177 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 742, 181 N.Y.S2d 198 (2d Dep't 1958).
Section 253(1) provides that when a non-resident's motor vehicle is involved
in an automobile accident in New York, jurisdiction may be had over him
by service of process on the Secretary of State. Section 253(2) provides
that such service is sufficient if notice of service, a copy of the summons
and a copy of the complaint are sent by or for the plaintiff to the defendant
by registered mail with return receipt requested. Section 254 makes the
provisions of section 253 applicable to service on a resident absent from
the state for more than thirty days. It has been ruled that the giving
of an incorrect address at the time of the accident estops the defendant
from claiming as an affirmative defense plaintiff's non-compliance with
section 253.
2153 Misc. 2d 615, 279 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Sup. Ct Kings County 1967).
22 CPLR 207(3), similar to CPA § 19, makes the tolling provision of
207 inapplicable where "jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can
be obtained without personal delivery of the summons to him within the
state."
23 ]FDH RsEp. 46.
24For a succinct analysis of the history of CPA §§ 12 and 21, see
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.

279, 285-87 (1966).

